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JAPANESE WHAliNG IN THE PACIFIC 
OCEAN: DEFIANCE OF INTERNATIONAL 
WHAliNG NORMS IN THE NAME OF 
"SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH," CULTURE, AND 
TRADITION 
REuBEN B. AcKERMAN* 
Abstract: Japanese whaling practices have always sparked controversy 
among the international community. Japan's recent defiance of 
international environmental norms, however, risks a full-scale trade war 
led by U.S. demands to reform Japan's whaling practices or suffer trade 
sanctions. Although the species' endangered status may support 
sanctioning measures under international law, the United States must 
exercise caution in imposing restraints on international trade in light of 
its commitments under international trade agreements. The future of 
Japanese whaling remains unclear, but the international condemnation 
and call for restrictions is well-founded on international whaling and 
environmental norms. 
INTRODUCTION 
Japanese whaling in the northern Pacific Ocean has sparked 
significant international protest, with the potential to become a full-
scale trade war if Japan refuses to reexamine and reform its whaling 
practices.1 The international community and conservationists allege 
that Japan is egregiously violating conventional environmental and 
whaling norms.2 Japan, on the other hand, defends its whaling prac-
tices as complying with the regulations promulgated by the Interna-
tional Whaling Commission (IWC) , the primary body charged with 
policing international whaling practices.3 
* Reuben B. Ackerman is the Senior Executive Editor of the Boston College International 
& Comparative Law Review. 
1 E.g., Jitendra Joshi, japan, U.S. Agree on Whaling Warkshop but Sanctions Fate Unclear; 
AGENCE FR. PRESSE,Jan.ll, 2001, available at2001 WL 2318791. 
2 Danielle Knight, Pressure Mounts on japan to End Whaling Program, INTER PRESS SERV., 
Nov. 14, 2000, available at2000 WL 28919729. 
3 I d.; Doug Struck, U.S. Fishing Sanctions Gall japan; Clinton's Response to Whaling is Seen 
as Election-Year Ploy, WASH. PosT, Sept. 16,2000, atA15. 
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In September, 2000,4 the United States attempted to pressure Ja-
pan into ceasing its illegal whaling by restricting Japanese fishing 
rights within the U.S. exclusive economic zone (EEZ).5 More impor-
tantly, the United States even has contemplated, although not yet im-
posed, trade sanctions as a more potent measure to stop Japanese 
whaling.6 In addition to disputing the illegality of its actions, the 
Japanese government also argues that U.S. trade sanctions would not 
comport with the requirements of the World Trade Organization 
(WT0).7 
This Note discusses the legality of the Japanese whaling industry, 
the reasons for concern within the international community, and pos-
sible resolutions under international law. Part I provides a back-
ground on Japanese whaling activities and the relevant international 
regulations on whaling. In addition, this section discusses the history 
of the IWC and its authority under international law. Finally, this sec-
tion analyzes the U.S. authority to impose trade sanctions and dis-
cusses conservationists' allegations that Japan's continued whaling 
research is actually a pretext for the commercial sale of whale meat on 
the Japanese markets.s 
Part II examines the legality of the Japanese action under the 
IWC regulations and accepted international norms. This section also 
addresses the legality and likely success of the U.S. imposition of trade 
sanctions upon Japan, and Japan's purported defense in the WTO. 
Part III suggests that trade sanctions may be warranted in light of Ja-
pan's refusal to cooperate with international demands and environ-
mental norms.9 However, this section also analyzes Japan's efforts at 
reconciliation with the United States and the establishment of the 
IWC workshop that may rescue Japan from sanctions, at least in the 
short term. Additionally, this section argues that conservationists' 
concerns are well founded, and that the unclear status of the species' 
4 Mark Rowe, U.S. Threatens Trade War with japan, INDEP. (LONDON), Sept. 24, 2000, at 
24. 
5 Dexter Van Zile, Op-Ed: As You Were Saying . .. It's Time for Administration to Lift Morato-
rium on Whaling, BosTON HERALD, Oct. 1, 2000, at 26. 
6 /d. 
7 See David H. Feldman, Stop japan's Whale Killing, BALTIMORE SuN, Dec. 28, 2000, at 
13A. 
8 Sue Fisher, Saving Whales, WoRLD ToDAY, July 1, 2001, at 25, available at 2001 WL 
13346504; Int'l Fund for Animal Welfare, japan's "Scientific" Whaling (Feb. 4, 2001), avail-
able at http:/ /www.stopwhalingnow.com/infojapanl.html [hereinafter japan's "Scientific" 
Whaling]. 
9 See japan's "Scientific" Whaling, supra note 8, at 3. 
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existence lends support for strict safeguards to ward against possible 
extinction. Finally, this Note concludes that Japan's defiance of inter-
national pressures, environmental concerns, and its exploitation of a 
loophole in the IWC's regulations warrants the imposition of trade 
sanctions and possible international liability under existing interna-
tional conservation agreements. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Japan's Whaling Activities 
Since 1994, Japan has conducted a "research whaling program" 
in the northern Pacific Ocean.10 This program is conducted in blatant 
defiance of objections of the international community, animal rights 
advocates, and environmentalists worldwide who claim that Japan's 
purported whale research is nothing more than a pretext for the illicit 
commercial use of whale products on Japanese markets.11 "Putting it 
plainly," former Commerce Secretary Norman Mineta said, "Japan is 
killing whales in the name of scientific research to satisfy a demand 
for whale meat in a few high-end restaurants and gourmet bou-
tiques. "12 When Japan announced the continuation and expansion of 
its controversial whaling program in 2000, and its intention to in-
crease its annual kill of certain species of whales in May, 2000, inter-
national outrage ensued.13 UK Fisheries Minister Elliot Morley de-
scribed the Japanese announcement as "a blatant act of defiance of 
international opinion," deserving ''widespread international condem-
nation. "14 Additionally, the IWC alleged violations of international 
whaling norms, because of an international ban on commercial whal-
ing, arguing further that Japan's alleged research purposes are an ex-
ploitative and disingenuous reading of the IWC regulations to ac-
complish Japan's commercial objectives.15 In defiance of IWC 
resolutions and the pleas of other countries such as the United States 
and the United Kingdom, Japan has targeted primarily minke 
whales.16 With the expansion of its research program, Japan extended 
10 /d. at3. 
11 /d. at 1. 
12 Steven Pearlstein, Clinton Presses japan to Halt lWzale Hunts, WAsH. PosT, Sept. 14, 
2000, atA31. 
1s &e, e.g.,]apan :S "Scientific" Whaling, sufrra note 8, at 3. 
14 /d. at 1. 
15 /d. 
16 /d. 
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its targeted whale species to the sperm and bryde's whales, mammals 
that are deemed endangered and protected under U.S.lawP 
In 2000, the United States threatened trade sanctions under the 
Clinton administration,18 butJapan avoided their imposition inJanu-
ary, 2001 after Mineta met with Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
Minister Yoshio Yatsu.I9 The two agreed to establish an IWC workshop 
to study the effects of Japan's whaling.2° While sanctions were not im-
posed at that time, the United States indicated the possibility that it 
would reconsider sanctions if Japan continued its whaling next year; 
thus the imposition of trade sanctions against Japan remains a possi-
bility.21 Instead of imposing sanctions at that time, the United States 
prohibited the continuation of Japanese fishing operations within 
portions of U.S. waters in September, 2000.22 It is uncertain whether 
the economic impact of this prohibition is sufficient to force Japan to 
conform its whaling industry.23 
When George W. Bush assumed the U.S. presidency in 2001, his 
administration reiterated the nation's support for the international 
community's call on Japan to cease its "lethal research program. "24 A 
bipartisan group of U.S. lawmakers also submitted a resolution calling 
on President Bush to take action against Japanese whaling, recom-
mending bilateral negotiations and sanctions.25 Although the United 
States has continued to express its opposition to Japan's whaling prac-
tices, it has not imposed trade sanctions and Japan has continued its 
scientific whaling program.26 
B. The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling and the IWC 
For centuries leading up to the early 1900s, whales were consid-
ered a "free resource, a gift from nature, available to anyone who 
17 Bandar Seri Begawan, japan, U.S. Near Deal on Whaling Dispute, jAPAN PoL'Y AND 
PoL., Nov. 20, 2000, available at 2000 WL 29267352. 
18 !d. 
l. 
19 Joshi, supra note 1. 
20 !d. 
21 See id. 
22 Kathy Gambrell, Clinton Skips japan Sanctions, UNITED PREss lNT'L, Dec. 29, 2000, at 
23 See Feldman, supra note 7, at 13A. 
24 U.S. Reiterates Objection to japan's Whale Hunt, JAPAN PoL'Y & PoL., Aug. 13, 2001, 
available at 2001 WL 24327338. 
25 U.S. Lawmakers Making Anti-Whaling Noises Ahead of japan-U.S. Summit, AsiA PuLSE, 
June 28, 2001, available at 2001 WL 20126665. 
26 See Daily Press Briefing, U.S. State Dept. (May 15, 2001), available at 2001 WL 
20824385. 
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would hunt and kill them. "27 During the first thirty years of the twen-
tieth century, industrial whale hunting became a m<Uor commercial 
industry that, over time, caused the depletion of many species.28 In 
the early twentieth century, prior to concerns of extinction, the whale 
hunting and fishing industries realized the need for regulation to 
maintain sizable numbers of whales for continued profitable whal-
ing.29 In 1927, at the Whaling Committee of the International Council 
for the Exploration of the Sea, whaling countries discussed restricting 
expansion and instituting a licensing system. 30 The International Bu-
reau of Whaling Statistics was thereafter established in 1930.31 Mter 
further negotiations, the Convention for the Regulation of Whaling 
was concluded in 1931 under the League of Nations and, for the first 
time, set forth whaling regulations covering all seas, including territo-
rial waters normally within the jurisdiction of the coastal state.32 This 
Convention went beyond mere commercial regulation in order to af-
ford some measure of conservation for whales worldwide.33 The tak-
ing of a limited number of species, such as immature whales, female 
whales accompanied by calves, and right whales, was prohibited alto-
gether by the Convention.34 However, despite the prohibitions, the 
1931 Convention did little to actually reduce and effectively regulate 
the overexploitation of whales, and by 1938, the extermination of en-
tire species of whale became a predominant concern.35 
Following World War II, most whaling nations recognized the 
need for a new international convention for the protection and con-
servation of whales because of the apparent decline in many whale 
27 Anthony D'Amato & Sudhir K Chopra, Whales: Their Emerging Right to Life, 85 AM.]. 
INT'L L. 21,28-29 (1991). 
28 !d. at 28. The total number of whales killed increased from over 10,000 in 1910 to 
54,664 in 1938. Anthony Matera, Note, Whale Quotas: A Market-Based Solution to the Whaling 
Controversy, 13 GEo. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 23, 37 (2000). The United States began commer-
cial whaling in the eighteenth century utilizing whales as an important source of oil. Sarah 
Suhre, Note, Misguided Morality: The Repercussions of the International Whaling Commissions 
Shift From a Policy of Regulation to One of Preservation, 12 GEo. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 305, 307-
08 (1999). With the development of the U.S. petroleum industry, the U.S. whaling indus-
try gradually declined. !d. 
29 D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 27, at 30. 
30 !d. 
31 !d. 
32 !d.; Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Sept. 24, 1931, 49 Stat. 3079, T.S. No. 
880, 155 L.N.T.S. 349. 
33 D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 27, at 30. 
34 !d. at 31. 
35 !d. at 31, 32. 
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populations.36 As a result, in 1946, the International Convention for 
the Regulation of Whaling (Whaling Convention) was signed and en-
tered into force in 1948.37 Today, over forty states have joined the 
Whaling Convention.38 Recognizing that it was "essential to protect all 
species of whales from further over-fishing," the Whaling Conven-
tion's stated purpose was to "ensure proper and effective conservation 
and development of whale stocks .... "39 The new international 
agreement superseded all previous whaling agreements.40 
The Whaling Convention established the IWC, which is com-
posed of one member from each party state.4I The IWC's purpose is 
to study and investigate whaling practices and to disseminate informa-
tion worldwide concerning methods of maintaining and increasing 
the populations of whale stocks.42 Since its founding, the IWC has 
evolved from an organization whose primary purpose was to facilitate 
commercial whaling into an organization focused more on conserva-
tion and protection ofwhales.43 
In 1986, in response to the realization that the existing regula-
tion scheme was not preserving the whale population, the IWC issued 
a moratorium on commercial whaling, following what it deemed dec-
ades of "over-exploitation which had driven several whale species to 
the edge of extinction. "44 Subsequently, the IWC issued numerous 
resolutions criticizing the Japanese scientific whaling program and 
36 Id. at 33. 
37 II A GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES TREATIES IN FORCE 777 (Igor I. Kavass ed., 1999). 
Today, the parties to the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling include 
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Den-
mark, Dominica, Finland, France, Germany, Grenada, Guinea, India, Ireland, Italy, japan, 
Kenya, Korea, Mexico, Monaco, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, 
Peru, Russia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Solo-
mon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, List of Member Nations, available at http:/ /ourworld. 
compuserve.com/homepages/iwcoffice/iwc.htm#members (last modified Mar. 24, 2001). 
38 Int'l Whaling Comm'n, List of Member Nations, supra note 37. 
59 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, art. XI, 62 
Stat. 1716, T.I.A.S. No. 1849, 161 U.N.T.S. 72, 4 Bevans 248, 249 [hereinafter Whaling 
Convention]. 
40 D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 27, at 33. 
41 Whaling Convention, supra note 39, 4 Bevans at 250. 
42 Id. at 250-51. 
43 For a brief history of the IWC, see The Humane Soc'y of the U.S., It Won't Be Smooth 
Sailing at the First IWC Meeting of the Millennium (Feb. 4, 2001), available at http:/ /www.hsus. 
org/programs/wildlife/marine/iwcOO.html [hereinafter First IWC Meeting]. See generall:y 
Johanna Matanich, A Treaty Comes of Age for the Ancient Ones: Implications of the Law of the Sea 
for the Regulation of Whaling, 8 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 37, 37 (1996). 
44 Rowe, supra note 4, at 24. 
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pleaded with Japan to stop the practice.45 The IWC contends that less 
harmful methods of obtaining the scientific research are possible and 
should be studied before Japan continues its whaling.46 Nonetheless, 
Japan ignored these requests and continued its whaling program.47 
Article VIII of the Whaling Convention permits countries to en-
gage in whaling for the purposes of scientific research.48 It is this pro-
vision that conservationists claim Japan has exploited in purporting to 
cease its commercial whaling, while continuing to kill and allegedly 
research whales.49 Critics question whether the scientific research is a 
mere pretext for commercial whaling.50 The IWC contends that the 
Japanese research explanations are not sufficient, and that its reasons 
are not "critically important" to justifY the killing of whales for re-
search purposes. 51 Moreover, the Japanese government sells the meat 
of whales killed for research purposes for food once the scientists 
have completed their work.52 This allegation is confirmed by DNA 
analyses that have found whale meat from these "researched" whales 
on sale in Japanese markets.53 Tests of 574 samples from Japanese res-
taurants showed that a high proportion of the whale meat being con-
sumed came from a highly endangered subspecies of minke whales. 54 
Although scientific permits for research whaling granted by a 
party state do not explicitly require IWC approval,55 as the leading 
45 japan's "Scientific" Whaling, supra note 8, at 5. 
46 !d. 
47 !d. Similarly, Norway has defied international pressures to cease lethal whaling in 
other restricted areas. !d. at 3. 
48 Whaling Convention, supra note 39, 4 Bevans at 252. Exceptions also have been 
granted for certain aboriginal groups. D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 27, at 56. D'Amato 
and Chopra maintain, however, that the aboriginal exemption and Japanese whaling are 
wholly unrelated. !d. 
49 The Humane Soc'y of the U.S., U.S. Threatens Sanctions Over japan's Extended Scientific 
Whale Hunt (Aug. 1, 2000), available at http:/ /www.hsus.org/whatnew /whale0801 OOO.html. 
50 japan's "Scientific" Whaling, supra note 8, at 5; see also Simon Cunliffe, japanese Whal-
ing: Good Science of Bad Taste, THE PREss, at 5, Mar. 23, 2001, available at 2001 WL 14118565. 
51 !d. 
52 Blair Pethel, japan Escapes Sanctions Over Whaling, THE REcoRD (BERGEN Co., N J.), 
Dec. 30, 2000, at A12. Pethel notes that Japan's Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fish-
eries estimates that sales of whale products totaled $6.7 million in 1998, the last complete 
year for which data are available. !d. 
53 japan's "Scientific" Whaling, supra note 8, at l. For the details of this research of Japa-
nese markets, see The Humane Soc'y of the U.S., japan Kills a Bryde's Whale (Aug. 11, 
2000), available at http:/ /www.hsus.org/whatnew/whale081100.html [hereinafter japan 
Kills a Bryde's Whale ]. 
54 Elizabeth Sullivan, Weeping and Whaling, PLAIN DEALER (CLEVELAND), July 2, 2000, at 
5D. 
55 See Whaling Convention, supra note 39, 4 Bevans at 252. 
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international authority on whaling regulation, the IWC has passed 
numerous resolutions criticizing Japan's scientific whaling.56 In a 1998 
resolution, the IWC strongly urged the Japanese government to re-
frain from issuing scientific permits, and highlighted the concerns of 
many in the international scientific community over the continuation 
of lethal whale research programs. 57 
The primary purpose of Japan's whaling program, Japan main-
tains, is to examine the impact of whales on the fisheries resources of 
the north Pacific, where whales compete for the same fish that feed 
humans.58 Japan's justification for the expansion of its north Pacific 
program is to "[s]urvey prey species and numbers consumed by 
whales in detail," and to further contribute to the study of ocean eco-
systems. 59 Specifically, Japan's research objective is to "obtain esti-
mates of various biological parameters, especially of age-specific natu-
ral mortality. "60 
Japan further argues that non-lethal tests and photography are 
not feasible research methods for these purposes.61 Moreover, Japan 
defends its practices by stating that the small take of sperm and 
bryde's whales will have only a negligible impact on the allegedly 
abundant stocks of whales for research purposes.62 Furthermore, Ja-
pan justifies its commercial sale of previously "researched" whales by 
the requirement of the Whaling Convention that the byproducts of 
the research be processed to ensure that resources are not wasted. 63 
In this regard, Japan argues that its research is not a mere pretext for 
commercial use, but rather specifically supported by the Whaling 
Convention. 64 
56 japans "Scimtific" Whaling, supra note 8, at 5. 
57 ld. 
58 Dan Goodman, U.S. Whaling Sanctions Smack of Hypocrisy, THE JAPAN TIMES, Sept. 17, 
2000, at 1. 
59 The Humane Soc'y of the U.S., japan Wants to Hunt Two More lthale Species (May 11, 
2000), available at http:/ /hsus.org/whatnew/japan051100.htm1 [hereinafter japan Wants to 
Hunt Two More lthale Species]. 
60 D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 27, at 54. 
61 ld. 
62 See id. at 54-55. 
63 Goodman, supra note 58. Article VIII, section 3 of the Whaling Convention provides 
that, "[a]ny whales taken [for research purposes] ... shall so far as practicable be proc-
essed and the proceeds ... dealt with in accordance with the directions issued by the Gov-
ernment by which the permit was granted." Whaling Convention, supra note 39, 4 Bevans 
at 252. 
64 Goodman, supra note 58. 
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C. The Possibility of Trade Sanctions and Other Potential Restrictions 
The U.S. imposition of trade sanctions in these circumstances 
may be authorized by the Pelly Amendment to the Fisherman's Pro-
tective Act of 196765 or the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment to the 
Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act.66 The Pelly 
Amendment is one of the U.S. government's primary tools to encour-
age other countries to comply with the Whaling Convention's conser-
vation policies.67 The Amendment permits the U.S. president to direct 
the Secretary of the Treasury to impose sanctions if the U.S. Secretary 
of Commerce determines that foreign fishing practices diminish the 
effectiveness of an international fishery convention, in this case, the 
Whaling Convention.68 However, the Amendment limits the U.S. sanc-
tioning ability such that it cannot conflict with U.S. obligations under 
existing international trade agreements, such as U.S. obligations to 
the Wf0.69 Arguably, the United States is restricted from imposing 
trade sanctions if such imposition will conflict with its obligations un-
der the Wf0.70 Moreover, the president's ability to impose sanctions 
is discretionary, and although such a measure has been threatened 
often, the United States never has imposed sanctions on the offend-
ing nations. 71 
Similarly, the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment provides for an 
automatic reduction of at least 50% of a country's allocation of fish 
that it can harvest in the U.S. EEZ, if the U.S. Secretary of Commerce 
certifies that a country is engaging in whaling practices that diminish 
the effectiveness of the Whaling Convention.72 In addition to custom-
ary international law concerning the EEZ discussed below, the imme-
diate denial of Japanese fishing rights, may, therefore, be permitted 
65 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a) (2000). 
66 18 U.S.C. § 1821 (e) (2) (A) (2000). 
67 Gene S. Martin & James W. Brennan, Enforcing the International Convention for the 
Regulation of Whaling: The Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments, 17 DENV. J. INT'L L. & 
PoL'v 293, 294 (1989). 
68 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a). 
69 See id. 
70 Feldman, sufrra note 7, at 13A. 
71 Suhre, sufrra note 28, at 317-18. 
7218 U.S.C. § 1821(e) (2) (A); Kazuo Sumi, The "Whale War" Between japan and the United 
States: Problems and Prospects, 17 DENV. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 317, 344 (1989). In addition to 
condemning the international community's treatment of whaling nations, Sumi contends 
that the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments are of "dubious legality" under in-
ternational law. /d. at 318. The utilization of the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment pre-
sumably provides the authority for the U.S. restriction of Japanese fishing rights in the 
EEZ. See 18 U.S.C. § 1821 (e) (2) (A). 
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by the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment to the extent Japan's alloca-
tion offish is in U.S. waters.73 
Japan has indicated that it will pursue a claim against the United 
States in the WfO if the United States imposes trade sanctions.74 The 
wro prohibits trade restrictions on a production process if the actual 
products being shipped into the country are not in violation of local 
health standards.75 The U.S. imposition of such trade sanctions would 
do exactly this, allowing the wro to prohibit such action, which may 
then provide some leverage for Japan in the whaling debate.76 Since 
whales are not the byproduct kills of some other commercial catch, 
and no whale products are shipped into the United States directly, 
trade sanctions may be necessarily limited. 77 The only option from 
this constrained view of U.S. trade power is to test a range of Japanese 
imports, such as certain perfumes, to ensure no trace amounts of 
whale oil are present (thus avoiding the limitation on production 
processes).78 Experts disagree on whether such testing will have a 
definite economic impact upon Japanese practices, at what is likely to 
be a high financial and administrative burden. 79 Additionally, should 
the U.S. testing be deemed harassment of lawful commercial trade, 
the United States may face liability in the wro on separate grounds.80 
A victory for Japan in the WfO is not entirely clear.81 The Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) contains certain excep-
tions for species conservation, thereby warranting some U.S. restric-
73 See 18 U.S.C. § 1821 (e) (2) (A). 
74 Feldman, supra note 7, at 13A. 
75 Seeid. 
76 Id. The author refers to a similar trade dispute resolution under the WfO between 
the United States and Mexico, where it was determined that the U.S. could not impose 
import restrictions on Mexican tuna despite Mexico's use of dolphin-killing nets. Id. "So 
long as the product met U.S. health standards, the production process was beyond the 
reach of U.S. trade policy." Id.; GATT Dispute Panel Report on U.S.-Restrictions on Im-
ports of Tuna, DS29/R (May 20, 1994), 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994), available at 1994 WL 907620 
[hereinafter Tuna ll]; GATT Dispute Panel Report on U.S.-Restrictions on Imports of 
Tuna, Aug. 16, 1991, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1993), available at 1991 WL 
771248 [hereinafter Tuna 1]. See generally GATT Appellate Body Report on U.S.-Imp. 
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Prods., Wf/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), 
available at 1998 WL 720123 [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle]. 
77 Id. 
78 Id.; Edward Alden, U.S. Takes Action on japanese Whaling, Sanctions Threat Fleets Face 
Ban From American Waters, THE FIN. TIMES (LoNDON), Sept. 14, 2000, at 11. 
79 Id. 
80 See id. 
81 See Alden, supra note 78, at 11. 
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tions.82 For example, Article XX provides that nothing in GAIT shall 
be interpreted to prevent measures "necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health."83 If the U.S. restrictions are deemed a 
necessary conservation measure, Japan may have little grounds upon 
which to challenge the U.S. action. 84 
A decision by the WfO and the principle governing "trade and 
the environment" of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Devel-
opment, however, indicated that the unilateral imposition of trade 
sanctions is only permissible if it is a last resort after exhausting all 
efforts at international cooperation.85 In the Shrimp-Turtle case, the 
U.S. prohibited the importation of shrimp and shrimp products from 
India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand because those countries' 
fishing methodologies were deemed harmful to species of sea turtles 
who were listed as endangered under the Convention on Interna-
tional Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES).86 The United States invoked the authority of U.S. law to use 
its economic power to influence other nation's environmental con-
duct.87 The states that suffered as a result of the U.S. sanctions sought 
relief in the Dispute Settlement Body of the wro.ss 
The WfO panel concluded that in light of precedent and Princi-
ple 12 of the Rio Declaration, that there is an emphasized need for 
"international cooperation and for avoiding unilateral measures. "89 
Since the U.S. applied measures without any serious attempt to reach, 
beforehand, a negotiated solution, the wro deemed the actions in-
appropriate.90 Although it noted that recourse to unilateral measures 
were not altogether excluded, the wro panel noted that general in-
ternational law and international environmental law "clearly favor" 
the use of negotiated instruments rather than unilateral measures 
when addressing global environmental problems.91 Accordingly, suc-
cess in the WfO would largely depend on the extent to which the 
82 /d. 
85 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XX, 61 Stat. A-11, 
T.IA.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. 
84 See id. 
85 Kuei:Jung Ni, Contemporary Prospects for the Application of Principle 12 of the Rio Declara-
tion, 14 GEo. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 2, 31 (2001). 
86 Id. at 28-29. 
87Jd. 
88Jd. 
89Jd. at 29. 
90 Ni, supra note 85, at 31. 
9!Jd. at 30. 
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U.S. has attempted and failed to reach a resolution of this matter 
through international negotiations. The United States has neither 
been successful in the Tuna-Dolphin case nor the Shrimp-Turtle case in 
applying trade sanctions to protect marine species pursuant to GATT 
Article XX, failing to satisfy the chapeau in both cases.92 
Japan also may claim that the U.S. sanctions and IWC restrictions 
constitute "cultural imperialism," because many Japanese have grown 
up eating whale meat as part of their culture.93 The Japanese Whaling 
Association claims that the modern ban on commercial whaling thus 
strips Japan of an important part of its culture and tradition, since 
whale meat traditionally has been a prized delicacy for special occa-
sions.94 However, any threat to Japan's sovereignty in this regard is ar-
guably outweighed, conservationists maintain, by the growing interna-
tional consensus of a genuine threat to whale populations.95 
As an immediate measure, the United States has denied Japan 
certain fishing rights within the EEZ of the Pacific Ocean. 96 This area 
typically extends from three to two hundred nautical miles from the 
baseline of the U.S. coast.97 Normally, the designation of an area as 
the EEZ yields "sovereign rights" to the coastal state for the manage-
ment of natural resources and other natural activities.98 Customary 
international law confers upon the coastal state "limited jurisdiction" 
over the protection and preservation of the marine environment.99 
Rights of other countries to participate in fishing in a state's EEZ are 
subject to the coastal state's regulation. too 
The United States exercised its coastal state authority in an at-
tempt to impose economic pressure on Japan without the question-
able legal authority of trade sanctions.l01 By prohibiting the Japanese 
92 See infra note 145 and accompanying text. 
93 Knight, supra note 2. 
94 Japan Whaling Ass'n, The Facts, japanese Culture (Mar. 2, 2001), available at 
http:/ /wwwJp-whaling-assn.com/facts.html. 
95 See, e.g.,]apan Wants to Hunt Two More Whale Species, supra note 59. 
96 Van Zile, supra note 5, at 26. 
97 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAw (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF UNITED 
STATES§ 514 cmt. a (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. 
98 Id. § 514 cmt. c. The norms for the law of the sea derive from the Second United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Id. Although the United States did not sign or 
ratifY that convention, the description of the EEZ, and many other provisions of the con-
vention, have been assimilated to U.S. practice under customary international law. Id. cmt. 
a. 
99 Id. § 511 cmt. b. 
100 Id. § 514 cmt. d. 
1o1 See Alden, supra note 78, at 11. 
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from fishing in these waters, and thereby protecting marine life within 
the EEZ, the United States subjects Japan to international liability for 
a violation of these restrictions.l02 Nonetheless, critics allege that this 
economic restriction only serves as a minimal deterrent against Japa-
nese whaling practices.I03 
D. Endangered Species Grounds and Concerns 
The Humane Society and other marine life advocates have fo-
cused on the Japanese whaling industry as violative of international 
law and a threat to whale populations worldwide.I04 In 2000, the Hu-
mane Society formally requested then-Secretary of the Interior Bruce 
Babbitt to certify that Japan was undermining the CITES Conven-
tion's objective to protect endangered species.I05 Although Babbitt 
made such certifications, immediate sanctions were not imposed un-
der the Pelly Amendment, presumably because of the concessions 
discussed above, namely the agreement to an IWC workshop to exam-
ine Japanese whaling and its temporary cutback ofwhale hunting.106 
The Humane Society highlighted the inherent risk in hunting a 
species that is either endangered or whose endangered status is un-
known_I07 While the sperm whale's status is listed as endangered,108 as 
is the bryde's whale,109 studies indicate that the population numbers 
of sperm whale seem stable.no Nonetheless, the Humane Society 
maintains that because of the numerous assumptions necessarily ac-
companying an estimate of whale populations, there is an inherent 
risk that these estimates may not be entirely accurate, and thus any 
1°2 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 97, § 514. 
103 See id. In October, 2000, in response to the Japanese actions, members of the U.S. 
Congress introduced a resolution calling on the U.S. president to withhold support for 
Japan's efforts to gain a seat on the U.N. Security Council. Knight, supra note 2. 
104 See, e.g., Humane Society of the United States Says New Leadership Provides opp(JT'tunity to 
End japanese Whaling, U.S. NEWSWIRE,June 28, 2001, available at 2001 WL 21895384;japan 
Kills a Bryde's Whale, supra note 48. 
10s Pethel, supra note 49, at A12. 
106 Seeid. 
107 japan Kills a Bryde's \Wlale, supra note 53. Others dispute that the particular species 
of whales being killed by Japan actually are endangered. Van Zile, supra note 5, at 26. Van 
Zile suggests that the population is large enough to support an annual commercial harvest, 
and that the conservationists' concerns are not well founded. See id. 
108 U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Species List, Species Profile, available at http:/ /ecos.fws. 
gov I species_profile/species_profile.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2001). 
109 japan Kills a Bryde's Whale, supra note 53. 
no japan Wants to Hunt Two M(JT'e \Wlale Species, supra note 59. 
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hunting should proceed with caution.I11 This cautionary note is sup-
ported by the fact that when whaling nations were not concerned with 
conservation, and whale counts were not as prevalent or accurate, 
continued whale hunting pushed several species to the edge of extinc-
tion.112 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. The Legality of Trade Sanctions and Their Effectiveness 
The Pelly Amendment authorizes the imposition of trade sanc-
tions where countries act to diminish the effectiveness of an interna-
tional fishery convention.I13 Regardless of a species' status as endan-
gered under the CITES Agreement or international law, therefore, 
U.S. law permits sanctions against Japan if the sperm and bryde's 
whale are being killed primarily for commercial use, contrary to the 
Whaling Convention moratorium.114 U.S. law also permits the denial 
of fishing rights the U.S.' EEZ when a particular nation undermines 
an international conservation agreement.I15 It is unclear how effective 
this measure will be in deterring future Japanese whaling; although 
some say the application of the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment, 
coupled with the mere threat of sanctions under the Pelly Amend-
ment, has been successful in the past in forcing compliance with the 
Whaling Convention.116 Fully imposed trade sanctions on Japan, if 
permissible under WTO scrutiny, likely would supply enough eco-
nomic pressure on the country to cease its whaling.I17 It is unclear to 
what extent sanctions would be imposed, and the Bush administration 
has not yet indicated how far it will go to apply pressure to Japan. 
Furthermore, success in the WTO for either Japan or the United 
States is uncertain.I18 As previously discussed, although the produc-
tion-process distinction weighs in Japan's favor and the United States 
ll1 !d. 
112 See D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 27, at 29. 
m 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a). 
114 See id. 
115 18 U.S.C. § 1821 (e) (2) (A). 
116 Martin & Brennan, supra note 67, at 314-15. 
117 See Rowe, supra note 4, at 24. Rowe describes the use of sanctions as a "nuclear 
trade weapon" that rarely has been threatened or used. /d.; see also Martin & Brennan, 
supra note 67, at 314-15 (concluding that the imposition and threat of sanctions under the 
Pelly Amendment have been relatively successful in encouraging whaling nations to com-
ply with the Whaling Convention). 
JIB See Alden, supra note 78, at 11. 
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is normally unable to restrict trade on products whose production 
processes do not violate domestic law, the United States may success-
fully rely on the exceptions in the WTO Agreement for species con-
servation.119 However, the disputed nature of these species' endan-
germent may prove difficult for the United States in the WTO, and 
the United States has not always enjoyed success on environmental 
matters in the WTO, presumably because of the sanctions' limiting 
effect on free trade and the established preference for international 
cooperation over unilateral measures.12° 
B. The IWC and Governing International Agreements 
Some party states, including Japan and Norway, have questioned 
the IWC's authority under international law because of its inability to 
enforce the regulations and resolutions it puts forth.121 These states 
also claim that the Whaling Convention does not prohibit the harvest-
ing of healthy whale populations, but rather promotes the sustainable 
harvesting of whale stocks)22 While it is unlikely Japan and Norway 
would repudiate their membership in the IWC, their objections signal 
a likelihood that they will continue to push for reform and test the 
outer bounds of whaling regulations.123 Additionally, Japan continues 
to facilitate the membership in the IWC of pro-whaling nations that 
will vote in accordance with Japan.l24 The Humane Society alleges 
thatJapan and Norway are attempting to "force the IWC to de-evolve 
back into a 19th Century view of the relationship between man and 
whale: one based on lethal exploitation with no thought to the fu-
ture."125 
Moreover, the Japanese Whaling Association (JWA), among oth-
ers, contends that the IWC has lost its legitimacy as an international 
regulatory body since it strayed from its fundamental objective of 
regulating the orderly development of the industry.126 Instead, the 
JWA suggests that the IWC has allowed itself to be taken over by anti-
119 See Feldman, supra note 7, at 13A. 
12° See Knight, supra note 2. See generally Tuna /, supra note 76; Tuna II, supra note 76; 
Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 76. 
121 See First IWC Meeting, supra note 43. 
122 See Matanich, supra note 43. 
123 See First IWC Meeting, supra note 43. 
124 /d. 
125 /d. 
126 See Japan Whaling Ass'n, l-W!y was the International l-W!aling Commission established? 
(Mar. 2, 2001), available at http:/ /wwwjp-whaling-assn.com/qa/why_iwc.html. 
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whaling groups such as Greenpeace who recruited into the IWC many 
countries that did not have any involvement in whaling.127 Conse-
quently, the JWA contends that the "blatant disregard" of the Whaling 
Convention objectives not only violates the Whaling Convention, but 
also the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.12s 
Additionally, these critics of the IWC contend that the IWC's 
regulations imposed upon whaling cultures are not based upon a 
need to protect whales from extinction.129 Instead, they argue that the 
restrictions are the result of a convenient political determination by 
the non-whaling states that lead the IWC, who fear no political retri-
bution (and expect only political gain) by the states' citizens since 
whaling is not a part of their culture.I30 Anti-whaling nations, in other 
words, have found a politically favorable topic and can push for con-
servation measures without the cost falling back on the electorate. 
These critics further maintain that commercial whaling can be main-
tained on a sustainable basis, and the whaling ban thus conflicts with 
the rights of human beings to "practice their culture. "131 
As an alternative to the outright ban on commercial whaling, 
some propose a quota system that would permit the hunting of those 
whales that can be harvested sustainably.132 Despite the fact that the 
IWC's initial attempts to regulate commercial whaling failed to pre-
vent endangerment and extinction, this proposal implausibly suggests 
that the IWC would be capable of regulating rigid quota systems for 
whaling nations. 
Pro-whaling nations advocate the adoption of a Revised Man-
agement Scheme (RMS).133 The RMS would provide rules, likely simi-
lar to the "sustainable" quotas discussed above, whereby nations could 
conduct commercial whaling.I34 The Humane Society maintains that 
the RMS uses unreliable statistical assumptions and that its inherent 
127 See id. 
128 Id. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that treaties shall be in-
terpreted in good faith in light of the treaty's object and purpose. Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980, art. 31, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340. 
129 Matera, supra note 28, at 37. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. For this proposition, the author relies upon the Rio Declaration on Environ-
ment and Development, which provides that states are to recognize the identity, culture, 
and interests of indigenous people and their communities. 
132 Matera, supra note 28, at 40-41. 
133 First IWC Meeting, supra note 43. 
134 Jd. 
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inaccuracies for sustainable development would render the program 
ineffective in achieving meaningful conservation.l35 
Certainly, Japan's refusal to conform to any of the IWC's resolu-
tions demonstrates the Whaling Commission's inability to effectively 
enforce its whaling regulations.136 In the IWC's favor, fishing regula-
tions are presumably difficult to enforce by any organization. It is in-
herently difficult to patrol all parts of the high seas, and scrutiny at 
fishing docks for illicit fishing practices may not always be wholly ef-
fective. Furthermore, as is demonstrated by tremendous restrictions 
on the ability to impose meaningful sanctions, illegal fishing practices 
may be difficult to deter, especially if such practices yield commercial 
success with little consequence. 
Nonetheless, Japan's refusal to comply with IWC regulations is a 
breach of its obligations under the Whaling Convention and the IWC 
has failed to successfully enforce any deterrent against or punishment 
of Japan.l37 The Whaling Convention specifically established the IWC 
as the authority for the regulation of whaling practices.l38 If the 
United States is precluded from imposing trade sanctions, Japan's 
breach or bad faith exploitation of this agreement may warrant liabil-
ity under international law. Similarly, Japan's hunting of endangered 
whales under the CITES agreement also may constitute a breach of an 
international agreement if such whaling is in fact commercial in na-
ture. The United States, or any other party to the CITES agreement, 
then may have a cause of action againstJapan.l39 
C. Marine Life Concerns 
The risk in hunting species whose endangered status is uncertain 
or even unknown causes great concern over Japan's practices because 
the risk of whale extinction and corresponding threat to the ecosys-
tem.l40 Japan has attempted to alleviate international environmental 
concerns through an agreement with the United States to request that 
135 Id. The push for a Revised Management Scheme comes from both sides of the 
whaling debate. World Wildlife Fund, WlWs Policy on Whaling, available at http://www. 
worldwildlife.org/species (last visited Mar. 8, 2002). Conservationists cite a need for a new, 
presumably more restrictive RMS in light of the increasing number of whales killed each 
year under the current regulations. Id. 
136 See World Wildlife Fund, WlW's Policy on Whaling, supra note 135. 
137 See id. 
138 See Whaling Convention, supra note 39, 4 Bevans at 250. 
139 See Japan Kills a Brydes Whale, supra note 53. 
140 Id. 
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the IWC set up a workshop ascertaining the effects of its "research" 
whaling on whale populations.141 This concession mitigated the possi-
bility of trade sanctions, at least temporarily, although the United 
States has not ruled them out.142 While Japan refused to cease its 
whaling program entirely, it did agree to temporarily reduce its catch 
by limiting its research targets to the sperm whale only.143 
III. ANALYSIS AND ADvocACY 
Should the IWC's authority for the regulation of whaling con-
tinue to prove as ineffective as it has thus far and should negotiation 
efforts continue to fail, the United States should be justified in impos-
ing trade sanctions to effect a change in Japanese whaling practices. 
Trade sanctions are permissible under U.S. law and may be supported 
by both international law and the parties to the Whaling Conven-
tion.144 Additionally, a case may be made for the applicability of the 
exceptions for species conservation under the WT0. 145 However, up 
to this point, the chapeau of Article XX has been the pivotal issue. 
Moreover, the overriding environmental concerns for preserva-
tion of a potentially endangered species support firm measures by the 
United States.l46 Other countries, such as the United Kingdom and 
New Zealand, also believe strong action is necessary.147 The only pos-
sible mitigating factors for severe action at this time are Japan's will-
ingness to continue negotiations for an amicable resolution and the 
state's agreement for an IWC workshop to study whaling.I48 However, 
although Japan has cut back on its whaling, it has not ceased its whal-
141 Joshi, supra note 1. 
142 See id. 
143 Struck, supra note 3, at A15. 
144 See22 U.S.C. § 1978(a). 
145 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1A, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, art. XX, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY 
RouND vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994). The chapeau provides that an exception "to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health" must not be "applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination ... or a disguised restriction 
on international trade .... "Article XX is reprinted in INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw HAND-
BOOK 227 (Roy Bhala, ed. 2001). 
146 See japan Kills a Bryde's \Wlale, supra note 53. 
147 japans "Scientific" \Wlaling, supra note 8, at 1, 5. 
148 See Joshi, supra note 1. 
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ing research in the interim period, despite the continued interna-
tional outrage.l49 
Japan claims that its research is for scientific purposes, yet it ig-
nores the non-lethal methods of obtaining the same research infor-
mation.l50 This disregard supports critics' charges of fabrication of a 
scientific purpose to cover for illicit commercial activity.151 Despite the 
unknown number of sperm and bryde's whales left, the CITES con-
vention deems the mammals endangered, and therefore it is incum-
bent upon Japan to comply with the emerging international consen-
sus regarding preservation of the world's ecosystem.152 Although the 
minke whale is not considered endangered, its populations have been 
depleted significantly by whaling in the north Pacific.153 Moreover, the 
experiences with commercial whaling prompting the establishment of 
the IWC and the IWC's subsequent inability to maintain sustainable 
whale stocks without restrictions on commercial whaling endorses the 
view that commercial whaling on a sustainable basis is an implausible 
goal. These experiences and Japan's general environmental obliga-
tions under international law, coupled with Japan's explicit promises 
under existing international agreements, supports halting Japan's 
current whaling practices. 
CONCLUSION 
Japanese whaling practices have caused an international contro-
versy due to alleged violations of international whaling regulations. 
Those alleged violations may give rise to a full-scale trade war, should 
Japan refuse reform of its lethal whaling. In light of the species' po-
tential endangered status and in light of international legal authority, 
the United States may be justified in imposing trade sanctions on Ja-
pan if it continues to defy international demands. For the time being, 
Japan's moderate concessions have delayed the imposition of sanc-
tions, and thus the future of Japanese whaling practices remains un-
clear. 
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